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The primary aim of this paper is to investigate  the discursive peregrinations of the category “Han” 
in the writings of the Chinese revolutionary theoretician and activist Qu Qiubai (1899-1935) ; this 
paper does not then deal with the theoretical and political work carried out by Qu Qiubai as the 
former leader of the Chinese Communist Party during the nineteen twenties, but  rather focuses on 
the texts concerning cultural and linguistic issues that  he wrote at the beginning of the thirties after 
retiring from direct political activism. I intend to analyze, through Qu's discourse on language and 
writing, how the category minzu (nation/ethnicity/race) and more specifically the idea of a Hanzu or 
Han minzu are deployed and integrated in his theoretical writing. 
In his writing of the early nineteen thirties, the author made a singular use of the signifier “Han” to 
talk about the language/writing of the Han (hanzi, hanyu)  as  that of a racial or ethnic group 
understood as hanzu. Narrating the history of the cultural hegemony of the Han in Asia and 
criticizing the policy of assimilation (tonghua), Qu elaborated a discourse which articulated and 
mobilized,  sometimes in a contradictory manner, the category Han both as a “race” and as a social 
class.  
Going beyond the race/class dialectic, we will try to show that these texts question the territorial, 
cultural and ethnic boundaries of “China” and its homogeneity. Even if the author  integrated the 
Han category in his discourse, I argue that his use of the notion in theoretical works dealing with the 
linguistic identity of China tends to deconstruct the modern invention of this homogeneous ethnic 
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community in two different but associated ways : the assertion of a linguistic multiplicity within the 
Han group and at the same time the identification of the traditional Han language and writing 
(hanzi, hanyu) with a dominant social class which overcomes this internal diversity. 
 
Qu Qiubai and the modern tradition of the category “Han”  
 
As Dru Gladney has said, the  notion of Hanzu or Han minzu in the sense of an ethnic community  
as the cohesive body of the nation is “an entirely modern phenomenon, arising with the shift from 
empire to nation”.
1
 The nationalist ideology in China, embodying the will to invent a political 
nation-state, goes back to the beginning of the twentieth century as a consequence of and as an 
answer to the Western imperial domination: nation as a concept and as a political form was to be 
used by Chinese intellectuals to build a new and strong state able to compete among the family of 
nations. The last hundred years have witnessed the political construction of the Chinese nation-
state, and this nationalist project has been sustained by the volontarist constitution of a cultural and 
linguistic homogeneity. Even if, as in all nationalist narratives, this history/story functions as a 
fiction, the nationalist ideology which invented boundaries between China and the outer world 
(these being not only political and state boundaries but also cultural, linguistic and ethnic ones) is 
nowadays deeply inscribed in the Chinese collective imaginary. In the modern construction of a 
Chinese nation, the Han as an ethnic/racial community functions as a major component of the 
discursive construction of the nation as one and homogeneous. The category Han is now an integral 
part of the Chinese collective consciousness and corresponds, in the Chinese society, to what the 
Graeco-French social philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis called a “social imaginary signification”.
2
  
From the first conceptualization of a “Han race” by the anti-Manchu revolutionaries to the invention 
of the “Han nationality” by the communists, the homogeneity of the Han community has never been 
questioned by  Chinese nation-builders. At the same time, the fact that the territory referred to as 
China under the Qing dynasty  greatly exceeds the physical habitat of the so-called Han, obligated 
Chinese nation-builders - both nationalists and communists – to integrate in different ways the inner 
others in their national narratives. The complex palimpsest of the narration of the “Chinese nation” 
is composed of different strata. The polysemy and ambiguities of the notion of minzu is the result of 
multiple intertextualities between the Japanese (minzoku), the European (nation), the Russian 
(natsiya, narodnost) and Chinese translations, besides being the consequence of the re-invention and 
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transformation of the meanings of minzu within the Chinese intellectual and political space 
according to various political and ideological orientations of the speakers. It is acknowledged that 
the first occurrences of the word minzu appeared at the end of the nineteenth century when 
theoreticians of Chinese nationalism, both reformist and revolutionary, borrowed this word from the 
Japanese.
3
 The word had been constructed by the Japanese to translate the modern-Western notion 
of the “nation” while the idea of nation came along with the European nineteenth century 
“scientific ”  discourse of the race struggle. In the political context of the anti-Manchu discourse 
developed by  revolutionaries at the end of the Qing dynasty, notions such as “minzu ”  and 
“Hanzu ”  had a racialist connotation in the texts of nationalist propagandists such as  Zhang 
Binglin and later Sun Yat-sen.
4
 
The connotations of the concept of Hanzu in the writings of a Chinese intellectual in the thirties 
cannot be understood without examining the semantic history of the signifiers of the community –
that is national, ethnic and racial. The imaginary of the “nation” and its boundaries is a recent 
phenomenon  in China, but it is interesting to note that in Qu's texts we can already find different 
theoretical and textual traditions which give it a polysemic sense often veiled by the translation of 
signifiers such as hanzi, hanyu, hanzu, Zhongguo, minzu, and so on. 
As a Marxist, Qu Qiubai would probably have contested an essentialist, biological, race-based 
definition of Han, it is however obvious that, like his contemporaries, he had integrated the notion 
of a Han ethnic majority as a dominant discursive category through which to read China's politics.
5
 
In Qu's texts, minzu is related to the Soviet  theoretical tradition concerning “nationalities ”  and “ 
national question ”  policies. This intertextual track is strenghtened by the fact that Qu spent many 
years in Moscow and spoke Russian fluently. The theoretical reference here is, of course, to  Stalin's 
1913 definition of  natsiya or “nationality ” .
6
 In this regard, minzu as a community of the capitalist 
stage identified by the “four common ”  criteria of the Stalinist definition is explicit in the author's 
political texts written in the nineteen twenties on the so-called national and colonial question.   
When he mentions the ruoxiao minzu or “weak and small nationalities ” , he refers to the ethno-
cultural communities living whithin political entities such as the Soviet Union or China.
7
  
The set-phrase “shaoshu minzu ”  or “ national minorities ” , which had a Comintern origin, already 
appears in the communist party literature of the nineteen twenties.
8
 The term was used to refer to 
the non-Han communities within the Chinese space, including refugees from various countries and 
foreign residents in the concessions.
9
 Qu uses the word minzu both for “small ”  nationalities and 
for the Han but we must bear in mind that in the theoretical framework of the communists, these 
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communities were not located at the same historical stage. In accordance with the communist 
literature of that time, we can say that in most cases the Han minzu was seen as the majority, as 
overlapping with China, and as  historically in advance compared to the other nationalities in the 
Marxist socio-economic framework. 
My purpose here is to question the position of the Hanzu or Han minzu as an ethnic category in 
relation to Zhongguo or China seen as a territory, a political entity and also a language in the 
writings of the author and to point out the contradictions or ambiguities in his discourse.  As I 
mentioned earlier, the Han question was not the main concern of Qu's texts in the nineteen thirties, 
it was nevertheless a prevalent element in his discourse.  
The author wrote extensively on the question of a common language for China which would not be 
a “national language ”  or “state language ” . His critics focused on the linguistic  project of 
invention of a standardized and uniform Mandarin-based “national language ”  (guoyu). 
10
 In his 
texts,  the author identified different linguistic communities referring to both the Hanzu and other 
nationalities. I believe that the discursive relation between the Han, the nationalities and Zhongguo 
in Qu's thinking can be clarified by focusing on the question of language. It is a way to elucidate 
how a Chinese revolutionary in the nineteen thirties understood and imagined the Chinese identity, 
that is to say China in its political, spatial, cultural and linguistic dimensions, by revealing some 
ambiguities within his discourse and identifying questions on his thinking concerning the relation 
between the Han, the “others ”  and China. Are the Han located in the same level as the “others ”  in 
his imaginary of China ? Is the Han category a synonym of Zhongguo in his texts ? Does the 
heterogeneity and diversity of the “others ”  necessarily imply a homogeneous and unique Han 
majority ?  
 
The Han as China 
 
I would first like to insist on the arguments in Qu's essays which give credit to the habitual thesis 
according to which the Han category is synonymous with Zhongguo and,  which consequently 
establishes the other nationalities as being outside this relationship. Let me quote here the author in 
a critique of the assimilationist position (tongwen zhengce) held by the poet and May Fourth 
movement the activist Liu Dabai (1880-1932). Qu aimed at proving that China, unlike in the past, 
no longer had the power and the dominant position -economic and by extension cultural- which 
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would have allowed her to impose an assimilationist policy on “alien races” (yizu). The dominant 
imperialist nations were now European countries and they were imposing their cultures on Asia and 
notably China's old vassal states. It is interesting to notice that in this passage Zhongguo and the 
Han are conflated :  
中国的汉族在古代历史上固然是文化先进的民族，远东的安南，暹罗，缅甸，高丽，日本都受着他的影响，而
采用汉族的汉字。[...]现在，中国自己的文化程度，在世界的政治经济舞台上，不能不承认是比较落后了。日
本是超越了中国一世纪。[...]其他的远东民族，都自然在文化上接受先进的欧美影响，而不再受中国的领导了
。中国现在还说要同化异族，用什么东西去同化人家呢 ?[...]中国还想用这种政策去对付蒙古西藏新疆吗？不知
道联合这些民族去反抗帝国主义？
11
 
In the historical past, the Hanzu of China was the most culturally advanced nation. In the Far East Annam(i.e.Vietnam), 
Siam, Burma, Korea and Japan have all been influenced by the Han and have adopted the Hanzu's Han characters. [...] 
Nowadays, we must recognize that China's own cultural level on the world political-economic  stage is rather backward. 
Japan is one century ahead of China. [...] [At the same time], other Far Eastern  minzu have naturally come under the 
cultural  influence of advanced Europea and America and  are no longer  under China's dominance . China is still 
talking about the acculturation of alien races [yizu], but with what does China want to acculturate others ? [...] Does 
China still want to apply this kind of [assimilationist] policy to tackle Tibet, Mongolia and Xinjiang ? Is China capable 
of  federating these minzu to resist imperialism ? 
 
In this last sentence, what is intended by Zhongguo is  a political space or entity and the other 
“ethnicities ”  refer to ethno-cultural communities. The author clearly sets these two different types 
of communities apart, and the relationship between Zhongguo, as a political power, and the 
nationalities allows no confusion in this quotation. But the situation gets more complicated and 
ambiguous when we try to understand how the third term of the conversation - that is to say the 
Hanzu or Han minzu - came to be included within the discursive relationship between Zhongguo 
and its “inner others ” . Qu uses the words Hanzu and Zhongguo de Hanzu to talk about a dominant 
culture - symbolized here by the characters Han – which deeply influenced many  Asian countries 
in the past. Later in the essay, as he deals with the question of the assimilation of the “alien races”  
(yizu) (Xinjiang,  Mongolia and Tibet), he uses the word Zhongguo and conflates this term with the 
notion of Hanzu. In the same way, it seems clear that in the last question quoted above replacing 
minzu by Hanzu would sound like a non-sense: Does China still want to apply this kind of 
[assimiliationist] policy to tackle the Hanzu ? It is obvious that in Qu's imaginary, the idea of China 
as limited to the Han community has been partly integrated. Qu gives a particular status to the Han 
nationality which finds its origin in the nineteenth-century nationalist invention of the category of 
the Han as a majority ethnic/racial community in China. This example follows the Communist 
party's position on nationalities at the end of the nineteen twenties which pointed to the possibility 
of future independance for non-Han nationalities on the grounds that they were not naturally 
included within  the Chinese nation. It is also coherent with Qu's position in his political texts 
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written in the nineteen twenties where he made clear that for  him “Zhongguo minzu ”  only 
included the Hanren, and within the Han themselves Qu said that the commoners were the sole 
representatives of the Chinese nation.
12
 
 
 
China as a language, China as a space 
 
Saying that in Qu Qiubai's texts China is synonymous to the Han would be too simplistic a 
resolution of  the complexity of the relations between the category Han, the nationalities and 
Zhongguo as a spatial, political and historical entity. I will now go a little further by questioning the 
relationship and differences between Qu's imaginary of the territorial and linguistic Chinese/Han 
space. The author recurrently used the expression Zhongguo yuzu or “Chinese linguistic family ”  as 
a synonym for “the languages of the Han ” . As mentioned above, Qu insisted in saying that the 
non-Han nationalities were not included in the notion of Zhongguohua: 
 
可以说 : 中国话是所谓中国语族的意思。因为中国境内 -- 除出苗，黎，西藏，蒙古等等不同的民族的言语之外 
-- 同是汉族的言语又有许多种. 
13
 
We can say that the Chinese language means the Chinese family of languages because within the Chinese [Zhongguo] 
space, -  besides  the languages of different nationalities such as Miao, Li, Yi, Tibetan or Mongol, there are  also 
numerous varieties Han nationality language. 
 
In one and the same sentence here, we can spot a double use of the concept Zhongguo : first, 
Zhongguo as a geographic territory in Zhongguo jingnei; and secondly, Zhongguo defining a 
linguistic community in Zhongguohua where the notion only refers to a limited Han ethnic group. 
On the other hand, Zhongguo as a territorial entity subsumes different nationalities or minzu 
including the Han. The“geographic concept” of Zhongguo jingnei implies the idea of an inner and 
an outer China, and the term used here also refers to the old Qing dynasty imperial territory. If a 
Chinese map involving a sovereign territory with fixed and precisely delimited boundaries belongs 
to a strictly modern imaginary, it is a historical fact that the Qing had already established 
boundaries with their neighboring states but its “frontiers policy operated within 'zones' rather than 
along 'lines' ” .
14
  
This  meaning of Zhongguo as a political territory including different nationalities is confirmed in 
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another text by Qu where he notes that ''[a]s a nation, China is not simply  the Han nationality; there 
are also  the Hui, the Tibetans, the Mongols, the Li, the Miao, the Yi ”  [中国不但是汉族的民族, 
还有回族, 西藏族, 蒙古族, 黎, 苗, 彝族.].
15
 The vision of China as a multinational state is in 
apparent contradiction with his Han-China conception. Therefore we can wonder whether  minzu 
has the meaning of a political community here as in the expression Zhonghua minzu ?  
If we consider language as a major ethnic criterion we can say that the author made a distinction 
between an ethnic Han China and a territorial, historical, imperial China overcoming this ethnic 
identity. This split within a Chinese space can be read as the classic distinction made by the 
communists, and by Qu in his texts, between “China proper ”  or Zhongguo benbu and “frontier 
regions ”  or Zhongguo jiangbu. As Liu Xiaoyuan remarked, if this distinction was used by the 
communists within the Marxist economic theoretical framework, it still echoed older  “in-grained” 
conceptions of the  ''frontier administration'' or bianzheng.
16
 This internal boundary between 
“proper'' and ''frontier'' China also corresponded to ethnic boundaries between the Han and the non-
Han read in terms of historical differences, that is to say economic differences, since the Han were 
considered as advanced compared to the “alien races” (yizhong minzu): “When applying the 
standard Marxist political-economic analysis to China's inter-ethnic situation, the CCP made a stark 
contrast between the burgeoning capitalist” China proper (benbu) and the “nomadic, primitive” 
non-Han frontiers (jiangbu) ” .
17
 
 
contesting Han ethnicity in emphasizing the plurality of languages   
 
The distinction between the homogeneous Han as the Chinese proper and the heterogeneous others 
within a global Chinese space or Zhongguo jingnei covering both territories is however put in 
questioned by the author's emphasis on the plurality of languages or dialects spoken within the Han 
community itself. If again the author gives a cohesive identity to the Han with the notion of 
linguistic family, he however recurrently insists on the inner diversity within this “family” and 
includes in it all the languages talked inside the “Han” Chinese world such asShanghainese,  
Cantonese, the language of Beijing, which were all subsumed under the concept of a “Chinese 
linguistic family”, a notion which means, according to the author, Zhongguohua or “Chinese 
languages ” . In many essays, as he criticizes the guoyu project, Qu considers a national mandarin-
based language which would be imposed on the Han population as a violence committed against  
Critical Han Studies Symposium & Workshop -2008 - Stanford University 
8 
the diversity of idioms spoken in China :  
 
对于他们绝对不应当实行所谓中国话的 “国语统一 ”的政策。就是汉族自己的许多种方言，也不能够实行强迫
的统一政策。
18
 
A policy of so-called Chinese (Zhongguohua) “national language (guoyu) unification  “ must absolutely not be applied 
to them [the nationalities]—just as a policy of coercive [linguistic] unification cannot be applied to the numerous 
dialects (fangyan) of the Han themselves. 
 
 
It is a fact that the homogeneity of the Han majority has seldom been questioned either by Chinese 
nationalist intellectuals or by “scientific” scholars.  Dru Gladney notes that  “discussions of China 
generally take cultural homogeneity for granted” and argues that “there is a tremendous ethnic 
diversity among its “official” minority nationalities, but also that there are equally important 
cultural differences among China's majority population, identified as the Han people.”
19
 
Significantly, the division between the Han as the Chinese ethnic group and the other nationalities 
does not imply in Qu's texts the unity of the Han. Qu even goes further in rewriting history and 
imagining the past fragmentation of China into numerous different nations and the constitution of 
multiple literary languages within the territory.
20
 According to Qu, the “Chinese family of 
languages” can be compared to the “Latin family of languages” and, in this perspective, he  insists 
on the fact that there were as many differences between the European languages as there were 
between the Chinese “Han” languages. If we compare this imaginary to China's contemporary 
situation, it is relatively explicit that today in the multinational People's Republic, the so-called 
official “national minorities” or shaoshu minzu 少数民族 function, in their diversity, as the other of 
the unique, homogenized Han majority.  
I would say that although it cannot be denied that Qu Qiubai still relied upon the category of the 
Hanzu as an ethnic community and imagined it through a  Marxist-Leninist socio-economic 
framework, at the same time, dealing with the question of language, which is one of the most 
important criteria in defining ethnicity, he repeatedly noted the extreme diversity within the Han 
and in a sense deconstructed or at least contested an essentialist vision of the Han-based identity of 
the Chinese modern nation.  
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The Han as a class which overcome China’s boundaries 
 
In taking into account the internal diversity of the Han, I argue that the author helps us to imagine in 
a singular way the traditional relationship between the apparent Han majority, the ancient “alien 
races” or modern “national minorities” and the old vassal states (shuguo and keguo) outside the 
Chinese imperial boundaries. Having taken for granted the linguistic diversity within “China 
proper”, Qu articulates this reality with the construction of a historical metanarrative involving a 
Han/Chinese culture (Hanzi, Hanwen, Hanyu) which formerly imposed its domination within the 
space named “Tianxia” that is to say a more or less large territory around the middle point of the 
Empire.
21
 When narrating the ancient “Chinese” cultural domination over  Asia, the authors stands, 
unsurprisingly, on a historical materialist point of view and insists on the “Hanzu” cultural 
domination as the consequence of its position as “advanced nation” in political-economical terms. 
In other words, if Japan or South-East Asian nations used  Han characters and  Han writing, it was, 
according to Qu, the result of an economic domination and of the political superiority of the Han.  
This cultural and linguistic hegemony was not read by Qu as a consequence of a race struggle, as 
the domination of one nation or ethnicity over another, it was seen rather as the hegemony of a 
social class, that is the bureaucracy and the gentry of the Chinese imperial state. That is, the 
common, at least in appearance, cultural and linguistic identity (Confucian culture and Classical 
Chinese) in Asia was interpreted as the hegemony of a dominant class. It is not surprising to hear a 
Marxist using the argument of the  class struggle to narrate historical evolution. But the shift, in its 
interpretation, from ethnicity to social class has profound implications on the way he imagines 
China and its identity, especially its cultural and linguistic identity. As he writes on the relations 
between this dominant class and the local populations (minzhong, pingmin), we can again witness a 
destabilization of the ethno-cultural frontiers or essential differences between a Han and a non-Han 
cultural space. Hence the fact that in the theoretical imaginary of Qu Qiubai, the cultural and 
linguistic diversity under the imperial bureaucracy cannot be understood only in terms of “Proper 
China” and “Frontiers China” or Han and non-Han populations and territory. This inner traditional 
frontier is here partly erased because Qu considers that the diversity under the dominant class also 
exists within the Han territory itself. Let me quote  Qu' s construction of  a fascinating comparative 
perspective which helps us to understand his geopolitical imaginary :  
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欧洲中世纪各国的绅士贵族用拉丁话,可是,各国民众所说的话,却仍旧是各国本地的话[...]远东的古代，各国
绅士都多多少少用过汉文，然而各国民众所说的话，却仍旧是各地的”土话”[...]就全中国本部来说，古代
个省的秀才举人的确用的是同一种的汉文文言, 可是中国个省的民众说的却是北京话, 广东话, 上海话...
22
 
During the middle ages, the European aristocratic class from different states were all using Latin while the languages of 
the people within these states were all local vernaculars. [...] In the  Far East in ancient times, the gentries of different 
kingdoms used the Han written language, however the peoples of these different states spoke there own local idioms 
[...] Over the entirety of China proper,  scholars of the various provinces province all used the same Han classical 
language while what the ordinary people of China's various  provinces spoke was Beijing dialect,  Cantonese, the 
Shanghainese and so on... 
 
It is not my purpose here to assess the scientific credibility of Qu's historical reading and 
knowledge, but to track the way he imagines and articulates spaces, populations, languages and 
cultures to inform his discursive (de)construction of the Chinese nation's identity. Qu develops a 
comparative approach articulating  three different socio-historical and political spaces so as to 
contest the cultural assimilationist discourse which claimed that in the past China had always been 
able to acculturate alien races, owing to its uniform Han writing system. We can nevertheless notice 
some basic differences between these three spaces:  Qu uses the concept of «China proper”  and 
thus naturally implies the existence of another and distinct part of the Chinese territory. Identifying 
local identities under these geographical spaces, he also mentions “sheng ”  or province in the 
Chinese example and deploys the term “guo ”  or country when dealing with Europe and  Asia.  
However, the numerous arguments the author puts forward in order to compare the European and 
the Chinese situations tend to deconstruct China as a nation even when reduced to the Han 
community. He objects to a Chinese or Han linguistic identity by insisting on the fact that this 
superficial unity (biaomian de shangceng de tongyi) and cultural homogeneity was made by the 
“ruling aristocratic bureaucracy” (guanliao guizu tongzhi).
23
 He reads China's linguistic differences 
in a vertical manner: multiplicity of local idioms among the people, unity of language and culture in 
the dominant class.  
Frank Dikotter reminds us that Liang Qichao “rearticulated traditional social hierarchies into a new 
racial taxinomy”.
24
 Similarly, Balibar (following Foucault) noticed that the old classical myths of 
race all have something to do with class distinction and especially with aristocratic identity.
25
 In 
reading the word “class” behind the word “race”, it is as if the texts of Qu were inverting the 
process by which these two concepts had been linked.  
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Etienne Balibar calls “fictive ethnicity” the way populations have been “represented in the past or in 
the future as if they constituted a natural community, possessing an identity of origin, culture,  and 
interests which would transcend individuals and social conditions”.
26
 He adds that there are two 
common means to invent this fictive ethnicity which are language and race. In China, since the end 
of the nineteenth century, the category Han has been the major figure of this “fictive ethnicity”. 
Qu's writings are  deeply imbued with this imaginary of the Han “fictive ethnicity”, a theoretical 
conceptualization produced by the Western political modernity and transformed in the Chinese 
historical context.  
Qu's discourse is however disrupted by his internationalist and Marxist ideological position which 
leads him to read the interests and logic of the class struggles behind the signifiers of the “nation”. 
In this perspective, a “national language” or old Mandarin, along with its characters, do not 
represent an ethnic community or even a people but only the culture of the dominant class 
artificially veiling the internal diversity within China. His cultural work of the nineteen thirties 
however tended to negotiate class problematics without neglecting local identities - especially 
linguistic identities – which take into account but also tend to overcome traditional ethnic 
categories. 
The essays by Qu mentioned here were written during a crucial historical moment for China which 
preceded the political invention of a national culture and language by Mao Zedong and his advisors 
during the Yan'an period, and  elaborated and implemented by the communist state after the civil 
war. The Chinese cultural and linguistic homogeneity and national consciousness which seems so 
natural now was still questioned at the beginning of the nineteen thirties by intellectuals such as Qu 
Qiubai. He never wiled political power and did not live to witness the construction of the People's 
Republic of China, but, without doubt, he would have been perturbed to see a state imposing a 
common language or culture while conceiling class hierarchies and local diversities. 
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